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2Summary
This paper analyses the results of the Convention debate and compares these results
with the positions and interests of the Czech Republic as a small candidate country. It
concentrates especially on the qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council. The paper
tries (1) to determine whether the proposed extension of QMV is in accordance with the
interests of the Czech Republic. The extension of QMV is compared with a study carried out
by the Prague Institute of International Relations. I also (2) compare the QMV mechanism
agreed at the Convention with alternative plans (QMV rules under Nice Treaty, Commission
proposal of double simple majority, and the 60:60 proposal). Finally, I sum up the merits of
the draft constitution in the analysed areas from the point of view of the Czech Republic.
31. Introduction1
The European Union faces presently a period characterised by double pressure: It is
now awaiting the single biggest enlargement in its history. And, at the same time, it is going
through a fundamental transformation, after which it should be better equipped to face future
challenges. This transformation should prepare the Union for functioning with a nearly double
number of Member States. But it should also gain the necessary tools for increasing its
effectiveness, legitimacy, and transparency both inside (towards its own citizens) and outside
(to the world in general). A series of intergovernmental conferences tried to tune the
functioning of the Union more precisely.
The work of the Convention can be understood as a logical consequence of this
process. As both Amsterdam and Nice Treaties were not capable of solving the pressing
problems of institutional balance in a comprehensive, all-acceptable and at the same time
transparent way, the Convention has been seen by many as a panacea for all European
illnesses.
It became, however, clear very soon that simple and transparent solutions are often not
compromise solutions. Thus, two dividing lines emerged: The old clash of federalist vs.
intergovernmentalist view of the Union and the new debate about big vs. small states and their
positions in the institutional architecture of Europe.
The Czech Republic, though sometimes boasting that it is a “medium sized” country in
European terms, clearly belongs to the camp of small countries. This is also the reason why
the Czech Republic plays a quite active role in the group of the “like-minded” countries that,
sometimes quite fiercely, fight against strengthening of the big Member States. The small
states were nevertheless not very successful in this endeavour during the meetings of the
Convention. Quite to the contrary, many delegates felt frustrated by the working method of
the Presidium, which often did not listen to suggestion for amendments, even though they
were proposed by majority of delegates.
The current Intergovernmental Conference is thus the event to which all Czech (and
other small countries’) hopes are pinned. The Czech political representatives go to the IGC
with an impressive “to-do” list. The list is topped by the formula “one country – one
commissioner”; this requirement was named as priority number one during Czech PM
                                                     
1 The ideas presented in the paper are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the official policy of
the Government of the Czech Republic.
4Spidla’s introductory speech at the IGC as well.2 This and the obvious reluctance of big
countries like Germany, France or the United Kingdom to reopen the question of the Council
reform has caused that other sometimes not less important questions have receded into the
background. This is the case of qualified majority voting in the Council.
In view of Spanish and Polish efforts to bring back the voting mechanism included in
the Treaty of Nice, the other big countries and especially Germany have adopted a firm
position towards this issue and reject any change to the newly agreed system. This no-change
policy is, however, to be seen exactly in the context of the possible return to the overly
complex Nice voting rules. So, a different change, which would still respect the demographic
proportions of the Member States and would simultaneously be more transparent and simpler,
is not altogether ruled out.
This analysis, therefore, aims at assessment of possible alternative models of QMV. I
analyse the Czech interests in respect to the qualified majority voting. After describing the
QMV debate in the Convention, I concentrate on both the possible extension of QMV and the
voting mechanism itself and its (dis)advantages for the Czech Republic and for other small
countries too. In the first part of the analysis, I use the data collected during a research carried
out by three research fellows at the Institute for International Relations, Prague.3 In the other
part, I discuss several alternative models of qualified majority and try to answer the question
of blocking potential of small countries when using these different models.
2. The Convention debate and QMV
A vast majority of delegates to the Convention felt that generalisation of QMV would
be appropriate because retaining the mechanism of unanimous voting would inevitably lead to
blocking and possibly even a collapse of the Council. 15 Member States may still be able to
find areas where everybody agrees with a new provision, thus making consensual decision-
making workable. 25, or 27 MS, respectively, would hardly find a way through.
The discussion about the qualified majority voting in the Convention can be, in the
same way as the discussion at the Nice Conference, divided in two specific debates: How to
define the qualified majority and how to adjust (extend) the area of its application.
                                                     
2 Češi věří, že své požadavky prosadí (Czechs believe they can push through their requirements), Lidové noviny,
7. 10. 2003
3 Drulák, Königová, Kratochvíl, 2003
5The need for a new definition of QMV seemed to be almost consensual during most of
the debates. The triple majority, which was the result of the Nice IGC, was too complicate and
its complexity did not allow it to be a good long-term solution for almost anyone. Therefore,
one of the main objectives of the discussions in the Convention was to simplify the QMV and
make the voting mechanism more transparent. Some countries, which profited from the Nice
results, such as Spain and Poland, made objections to any changes from the very beginning to
the very end (and even beyond). This caused fears of other countries that they might slip from
the debate about what changes to introduce back to whether change the Nice results at all.
The solution presented by the Commission seemed to be the proposal with strongest
support. The Commission brushed up its old proposal from the pre-Nice times and suggested
the double simple majority which would consist of simple majority of Member States and
simple majority of population.4 The Presidium of the Convention, however, did not wholly
incorporate this proposal into the draft text: Instead, it accepted the requirement of big
countries to increase the population criterion from 50 to 60 percent.5
After this move of the Presidium it was only natural that most amendments to the draft
text came from small countries’ delegates. The group of countries which opposed the
Presidium proposal was made up largely out of small countries, among them Austria, the
Benelux Countries, Finland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia.6 Greek delegates suggested a change exactly reflecting the
Commission proposal7 and others pushed it even farther to the extreme. For example, Czech
delegate Josef Zieleniec believed that qualified majority should consist of “at least 2/3 of
Member States, representing the majority of the population of the Union.”8
Michel Barnier and other members of the Commission also argued in detail against the
Presidium proposal. They stressed the principle of transparency and pointed to numerous
advantages of the simple double majority. Their main argument was nevertheless an intricate
one: As any change adopted in the Convention should not cause decrease in effectiveness of
QMV, and as the smallest possible qualified majority in terms of population could be reached
                                                     
4 Suggestion for Amendment by Barnier et al., http://european-
convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/417999/17terBarnier%20EN_FR.pdf
5 Draft Constitution, Part IV (before the revision of 13. 6.), http://european-
convention.eu.int/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN&amp;Content=
6 Halligan, 2003
7 Papandreou and Katiforis, http://european-convention.eu.int/amendments.asp?content=417999&lang=EN
8 Suggestion for Amendment by Josef Zieleniec, http://european-
convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/417999/17terZieleniecEN.pdf
6with about 57% of the Union’s population according to the text of the Nice Treaty, there
should be no increase of the population threshold. 9
During the last month, in view of the deadlock in the negotiations about the new QMV
rules, the idea of maintaining the status quo agreed on in Nice was revived. So, although most
Member States were not content with this development, the discussion nevertheless turned
from the debate about the models which would replace the old Nice voting mechanism to the
discussion about the costs and benefits of replacing the Nice system. Eventually, the group of
countries supporting the Nice status quo, lead by Spain and Poland, gained the support of
several other countries represented at the Convention.
Some other big countries, especially the United Kingdom, slowly changed their
attitudes towards more favourable judgement of the Nice QMV rules and did not back further
changes in this area any more. Some of the big countries remembered that the Nice
negotiations were seen as a big success of the French and British in the sense of keeping the
German voting power in parity with the other big three. The Convention was obviously
prepared to change this equilibrium in favour of Germany and here was an opportunity to
change this stance. No wonder that the British delegate Peter Hain expressed satisfaction with
the Nice arrangement and rejected its changes.10
The discussions about the extension of the qualified majority voting were not any
easier. The only consensual result was the necessity to generalise the use of QMV in all areas
where the constitutional treaty does not state otherwise. This was a clear sign of change of
climate: The current wording of the Treaties almost always determines whether qualified
majority voting or unanimity should be the voting rule in the particular situation. Now, the
Presidium draft text clearly defined areas where unanimous decision-making is required, and
for all other questions QMV would be the ordinary voting rule. Such generalisation of QMV
was really consensual. Quite to the contrary, the extension of application of QMV itself
remained a hotly contested issue during the whole Convention.
                                                     
9 Suggestion for Amendment by Barnier et al., http://european-
convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/417999/17terBarnier%20EN_FR.pdf The authors of the Amendment also
point out that „since, with the system proposed for the Constitution, the weight of each Member State will be
expressed directly in terms of population and no longer in votes, there is no longer any justification for the
provision allowing confirmation that the votes of the Member States which constitute a qualified majority
represent at least 62%.“ (Ibid.)
10 Suggestion for Amendment by P. Hain, http://european-
convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/417999/17terHain.pdf
73. The Czech Republic (ČR) and the applicability of QMV
Every Member State, irrespective of its size, tried to determine those areas where
unanimity was absolutely vital from its point of view.  Similarly, the Candidate Countries
were asked to formulate precisely their positions on the possible QMV extension. The
candidates, however, answered such pleas with great difficulties because they had not had
enough experience with protecting their interests in the complex web of interdependence of
the European Union.
In addition, at first there were almost no signs of co-operation or at least co-ordination
because the individual candidate countries were able to make only rough estimates of what
the other candidates’ positions in the discussed area would be. So, for a long time, no one was
sure about the position of the candidate countries in this debate: Whether they will fiercely
defend their rights or acquiesce to the demands of current (big) Member States.
The Czech Republic was no exception to this because the precise official Czech
position remained unknown during most of the Convention work. The delegate of the Czech
government, Mr. Jan Kohout made only several vague statements without specifying where
QMV would be insurmountable obstacle for the Czechs and where the Czech position was
only a starting point for further negotiations. It is true, Mr. Kohout welcomed the combination
of QMV with co-decision in the EP in the Czech Government’s Non-paper11 but, again, he
failed to specify the areas where this should apply.
The Czech Republic was, however, probably the first candidate country not only to
realise the absence of a clear definition of its national interests in regard to QMV but also to
try to improve the situation by having an extensive study carried out, which could give the
country the required information about the transition from the unanimity to QMV and the
impact on the ČR.12
Our research concentrated on provisions of the Treaty establishing the European
Community. This is a very important qualification because by doing so, we left out some
important, yet highly politically sensitive and divisive areas like foreign and security policy
etc. We carried out the study in several stages: The first step was the identification of the
articles where the extension of QMV is thinkable at all in short term. The second step was the
preliminary assessment of the authors of the study and the third and the crucial one was
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12 Drulák, Königová, Kratochvíl, 2003 (http://www.iir.cz/cz/czcea/czet/analyzaQMV.pdf).
8holding a number of interviews with ministerial experts and officials responsible for the
accession negotiations.
In the final step, we divided all articles in two groups depending on whether the ČR is
for or against QMV in the discussed areas. The need for two more groups arose as well: The
first contained those articles where the experts found some important arguments for QMV and
some against the extension. In the last group, we put those areas largely irrelevant to the ČR.
Before the Nice Treaty, there were around 73 articles with unanimous voting to be
found. The unanimity in some of these fields was politically so sensitive that the extension of
QMV would be absolutely impossible. For this reason, the French a Portuguese Presidencies
subsequently identified 46 cases13 where unanimity could be replaced by qualified majority
and two other articles which could be deleted entirely. Knowing the results of the Nice IGC,
we can subsume the items where the transition to QMV was possible under three groups:
1. The areas where the Nice IGC decided about transition to QMV immediately after the
Treaty coming into force
2. The areas where QMV is explicitly considered a future possibility
3. The areas where extension of QMV was rejected.
The following list includes all articles we should concentrate our attention on, i.e. the third
group (inclusive even those articles where the extension was only partial), and those articles
from the second group where the transition to QMV was not exactly determined (e.g. some
aspects of articles 67 or 137).
• Art. 18 /ex-Art. 8a  Free movement of persons14
• Art. 42/ex-Art. 51  Measures in the field of social security
• Art. 47/ex-Art. 57  Mutual recognition of diplomas
• Art. 62/ex-Art. 73j  Visa measures
• Art. 63/ex-Art. 73k  Asylum measures, refugees
• Art. 66/ex-Art. 73n  Administrative co-operation
• Art. 67/ex-Art. 73o  Transitional provision (Court of Justice)
                                                     
13 The list of the articles can be found at CONFER 4776/00
9• Art. 71/ex-Art. 75 Necessary measures in the field of transport
• Art.  80/ex-Art. 84 Measures on transport
• Art. 93/ex-Art. 99 Harmonisation of indirect taxation
• Art. 133/ex-Art. 113 Common trade policy; implementation
• Art.137/ex-Art.118 Improvement of working conditions; minimum requirements; social
measures
• Art. 151/ex-Art. 128    Co-operation in culture
• Art. 175/ex-Art. 130 The principle that the polluter should pay
• Art. 187/ex-Art. 136  Rules for the association
• A new article 256(a) Establishment of decentralised agencies
• Art. 296/ex-Art. 223  Security interests of the Member States
• Art. 300/ex-Art. 228  Agreements of the Community
• Art. 94/ex-Art. 100 Approximation of  laws and other provisions 15
• Art. 144/ex-Art. 121    Tasks delegated to the Commission (in social area)16
To these short-term priorities, we added some other provisions (from the TEC) which were
not discussed under the French and Portuguese Presidencies:
• Art. 13 (1) Actions to combat discrimination
• Art. 19 (1) Right to vote (municipal elections and the elections to the EP)
• Art. 22 Extension of the rights of the citizens of the EU
• Art. 57 (2) Restrictions of the movement of capital
• Art. 88 (2) Compatibility of State aid with the rules of the Common Market
• Art. 105 (6) Specific tasks of the ECB
• Art. 107 (5) Changes of statute ESCB and ECB
• Art. 111 (1) Exchange rates
• Art. 123 (5) Abolition of derogation (from the common currency)
• Art. 139 (2) Social dialogue
• Art. 157 (3) Competitiveness of industry
                                                                                                                                                                     
14 The titles of are only approximate description of the articles and the areas where QMV was used as the official
consolidated version does not include these titles. Cf. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ec_cons_treaty_en.pdf
15 Deletion of the article proposed.
16 Deletion of the article proposed. The article was not analysed in the study.
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• Art. 190 (4) Elections to the EP according to a single procedure
• Art. 213 (1) Alterations of the number of  members of the Commission
• Art. 221 Increases in the number of Judges
• Art. 222 Increases in the number of Advocates-General
• Art. 225 (2) Court of First Instance
• Art. 245 Statute of the Court of Justice, Rules of Procedure
• Art. 269 Own Resources
• Art. 290 Languages
• Art. 308 Measures to attain the objectives of the Community
In the second step (after preliminary estimates of the authors), the articles were
consulted with ministerial experts and officials and corrected according to their views. (I
marked with cursive those articles that do no belong to the short-term relevant provisions
identified by the French and Portuguese Presidencies.)
Group 1: Arguments for QMV extension clearly dominate
• Art. 18 Free movement of persons
• Art. 42 Measures in the field of social security
• Art. 47(2) Mutual recognition of diplomas
• Art. 57(2) Restrictions of the movement of capital
• Art. 62 Visa measures
• Art. 63 Asylum measures, refugees
• Art. 67(5) Transitional provision (Court of Justice)
• Art. 71(2) Necessary measures in the field of transport
• Art. 80 Measures on transport
• Art. 88(2) Compatibility of State aid with the rules of the Common Market
• Art. 93 Harmonisation if indirect taxation
• Art. 94 Approximation of  laws and other provisions
• Art. 133 Common trade policy
• Art. 137 Improvement of working conditions; minimum requirements; social measures
(except 1c)
• Art. 139 Social dialogue (except provisions related to 137 (1)c)
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• Art. 157(3) Competitiveness of industry (or group 3)
• Art. 175(2) The principle that the polluter should pay
• Art. 213 (1) Alterations of the number of  members of the Commission
• Art. 222 Increases in the number of Advocates-General
• Art. 290 Languages (or group 3)
• Art. 308 Measures to attain the objectives of the Community
Group 2: The extension of QMV should be rejected
• Art. 13(1) Actions to combat discrimination
• Art. 19(1) Right to vote (municipal elections and the elections to the EP)
• Art. 22 Extension of the rights of the citizens of the EU (or group 4)
• Art. 137 (1c) Improvement of working conditions; minimum requirements; social
measures (except 1c)
• Art. 139 (measures related to 137 (1)c)
• Art. 190 (4) Elections to the EP according to a single procedure (or group 3)
• Art. 221 Increases in the number of Judges
• Art. 225 (2) Court of First Instance
• Art. 245 Statute of the Court of Justice, Rules of Procedure
• Art. 269 Own resources
• Art. 296(2) Security interests of the Member States (or group 4)
Group 3: there are strong arguments both for and against QMV
• Art. 66 Administrative co-operation (or group 4)
• 300 Agreements of the Community
Group 4: the articles which are largely irrelevant for the ČR
• Art. 151(5) Co-operation in culture
• Art. 187 Rules for the association
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The following table compares the results of the presented study with the procedures proposed
in the analysed areas by the draft constitution.
Table 1
Comparison of proposed extensions of QMV
Numbering
(Treaty of
Nice)
Included
in the
French
proposal
Extension of
QMV
according to
the presented
study
Extension of
QMV
according to
the draft
constitution
Numbering
(draft
constitution)
Notes
13 (1) no no no III-5 consultation of the EP
18 yes yes no III-6 consultation of the EP
19(1) no no no III-7 consultation of the EP
22 no no no III-10 consent of the EP
42 yes yes yes III-18 co-decision of the EP
47(2) yes yes yes III-23 co-decision of the EP
57(2) no yes no III-43 consultation of the EP
62 yes yes yes chapter IV,
Section2
co-decision of the EP, QMV
some areas
63 yes yes yes chapter IV,
Section2
co-decision of the EP, QMV
some areas
66 yes ambiguous yes III-180 co-decision of the EP
67(5) yes yes  not
specified17
X18
71(2) yes yes yes III-129 co-decision of the EP
80 yes yes yes III-138 co-decision of the EP,
consultation of the ESC and
the CoR
88(2) no yes no III-54
93 yes yes no III-59 consultation of the EP and
the ESC;  III-59(2) and III-60:
possible unanimous decision
about extension of QMV
94 yes deletion or
specification
no III-61 consultation of the EP and the
ESC
133 yes yes no III-212(4) QMV not possible in those
areas where unanimous
adoption of internal rules is
required
137 (except
1c)
yes yes no III-99 possible unanimous decision
about extension of QMV (III-
                                                     
17 This means that the new article does not mention decision-making or adoption of European laws.
18 There is no clearly corresponding article in the draft constitution.
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99(3) after consulting the EP
137(1c) no no no III-99
139 no yes no III-101 unanimity in areas connected
with III-99 (1) c, d, f, g.
139 (in
connection
with 137
(1c)
no no no III-101
151(5) yes irrelevant yes III-176 co-decision of the EP, QMV
not possible in regard to
harmonisation of law and
regulation measures
157(3) no yes yes III-175 co-decision of the EP,
consultation of the ESC and
the CoR
175(2) yes yes no III-125 possible unanimous decision
about extension of QMV
187 yes irrelevant no III-186
190 no no no III-227 consent of the EP
213(1) no yes not specified III-245
221 no no not specified III-254
222 no yes no III-255
225 no no not specified III-259
245 no no yes III-285 on request of the ECJ after
consulting the EC or on
request of the EC after
consulting the ECJ
269 yes no no I-53 consultation of the EP
290 no yes no III-335
296(2) no no no III-338
300 yes ambiguous yes III-222 except for treaties that tackle
questions for which
unanimity is required; consent
of the EP
308 no yes not specified X
Sources: CONFER 4776/00; CONV 802/03; Drulák, Königová, Kratochvíl, 2003
It is obvious that the Convention draft is the most moderate of the three alternatives in
Table 1. The Czech position presented in the study aims at rather far-reaching QMV
extension. The French proposal rejects QMV extension in eight provisions where Czech
experts believe QMV would be advantageous (and there is a difference in other six
provisions) (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1
Comparison of the alternative proposals
When looking at the differences in the most sensitive areas, four issues should attract our
greatest attention:
1. Experts from Czech Labour and Social Affairs Ministry propose extension of QMV to
almost every aspect of the EU social policy: This means above all articles 42 and 137 with
the sole, yet important exception of social security  (137 (1)c). The Convention text is
much more conservative and recommends a change only in art. 42. In some aspects of art.
137 (III-99(3)) the draft text explicitly states that QMV should remain a future possibility
which should however be decided by unanimous agreement in the Council (passerelle
clause). Such transition is nevertheless not possible in the most sensitive area – social
security.
2. In a similar way, Czech experts support extension of QMV in the area of indirect taxation
and harmonisation of related provisions. The advantages of harmonisation in the form of
tax fraud prevention, simplification of tax systems and tax collection are considered to be
more important than the risk of creeping tax unification which might follow the
harmonisation. The draft constitution does not introduce QMV but it counts on a possible
change (decided unanimously) in the field of administrative co-operation and fight against
tax evasion.
1. Czech ministerial experts and officials express themselves in favour of QMV in the third
contested area as well – asylum and refugees. The ČR badly needs a clear and unified
definition of asylum and refugee status. The main obstacle to the unification is, according
French
proposal Czechstudy Draft treaty
0
5
10
15
20
number of unanimity
provisions
number of QMV
provisions
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to the experts, unanimous decision-making in the Council. More to that, a further increase
in the number of refugees asking for asylum in the ČR can be expected after its accession
to the EU. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to accelerate the adoption of European
norms in this area which could help to share the immigration burden all over the EU.
4. Some other important articles that were examined in the study confirm, however, that
Czech experts are not blindly integration-minded: There was clear consensus among them
that decisions about own resources of the Union should stay unanimous. The situation in
the Convention was similar: Even the strongest advocates of further integration did not
propose QMV in this field. There were, however, some voices calling for super-qualified
majority here (for example, three quarters of the Member States and two thirds of the
population).19
Some of the results of the study may be influenced by the fact that the current Czech
government is inclined to promoting deeper integration of the Continent. After a change of
government, Czech national interests could be redefined in order to be compatible with the
views of the new governing party (parties). This is also one of the reasons why the aim of the
study was not to analyse the view of the top political representatives but rather the ministerial
experts who should be more independent of political influences.
Should the current government (left wing Social Democratic Party, centrist Christian
Democrats and right wing Freedom Union) be replaced by more Euro-sceptical parties (right
wing Civic Democratic Party), we should expect major changes in some key areas. The
changes could affect the common foreign and security policy, the social policy and also many
institutional questions. Only minor or no changes could be expected in the field of asylum of
refugees and other areas where the interests of the ČR stem rather from the stage of its
development (cohesion policy), or its geographical position (combating international crime).
4. The ČR and the QMV mechanism
As one of its main targets, the Convention strove for greater transparency and
simplicity of the EU institutions. The triple criterion agreed in Nice belonged to the infamous
group of most complicated institutional solutions ever and, as such, it was totally
incomprehensible to the public. This together with the need for a more “democratic” Union
(which means a Union reflecting the population in each Member State and, effectively, better
                                                     
19 See the contribution by A. Duff, CONV487/03, http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/fr/03/cv00/cv00487fr03.pdf
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position for Germany) was the reason why most of the proposed changes endeavoured to
make QMV decisions easier and simpler.  The most obvious example of this trend was the
already mentioned Commission proposal of double simple majority.20
Although the small Member States, the European Parliament and the European
Commission protested against further strengthening of the size of the Member States without
offering sufficient safeguards to the smaller countries which would inevitably lose part of its
voting power, the final formula in the draft constitution text tips the balance heavily towards
the bigger Member States. Hereafter, a provision shall be adopted by QMV on basis of a
decision by majority of Member States representing at least two thirds of the Union’s
population. Table 2 compares the positions of the Member States under Nice rules (population
threshold and weighting votes) with the draft constitution.
Table 221
Shares of blocking minority
Country Number of
inhabitants
% of the
Union’s
population
% of blocking
minority (pop.
threshold, draft
constitution)
% of blocking
minority (pop.
threshold, NT)
Voting
weights
(NT)
% of blocking
minority
(voting
weights, NT,
Protocol 2122)
Germany 82555 17,09% 42,62% 44,86% 29 31,87%
France 59637 12,34% 30,77% 32,39% 29 31,87%
United
Kingdom
59088 12,23% 30,50% 32,10% 29 31,87%
Italy 56464 11,69% 29,15% 30,68% 29 31,87%
Spain 40683 8,42% 21,00% 22,10% 27 29,67%
Poland 38609 7,99% 19,93% 20,97% 27 29,67%
Romania 22330 4,62% 11,52% 12,13% 14 15,38%
Netherlands 16195 3,35% 8,35% 8,79% 13 14,29%
Greece 11018 2,28% 5,61% 5,98% 12 13,19%
Portugal 10406 2,15% 5,36% 5,64% 12 13,19%
Belgium 10346 2,14% 5,34% 5,62% 12 13,19%
Hungary 10155 2,10% 5,24% 5,51% 12 13,19%
Czech rep. 10144 2,10% 5,24% 5,51% 12 13,19%
Sweden 8943 1,85% 4,61% 4,86% 10 10,99%
Austria 8159 1,69% 4,21% 4,44% 10 10,99%
Bulgaria 7801 1,61% 4,01% 4,23% 10 10,99%
Denmark 5388 1,11% 2,77% 2,91% 7 7,69%
                                                     
20 Suggestion for Amendment by Barnier et al., http://european-
convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/417999/17terBarnier%20EN_FR.pdf
21 We analyse the data after the enlargement to 27 Member States.
22 Protocol 21, Treaty of Nice, http://www.evropska-
unie.cz/download/cz/oficialni_dokumenty/Smlouvy_EU/Smlouva_z_Nice.pdf
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Slovakia 5378 1,11% 2,77% 2,91% 7 7,69%
Finland 5207 1,08% 2,69% 2,83% 7 7,69%
Ireland 3931 0,81% 2,02% 2,13% 7 7,69%
Lithuania 3460 0,72% 1,80% 1,89% 7 7,69%
Latvia 2329 0,48% 1,20% 1,26% 4 4,40%
Slovenia 1996 0,41% 1,02% 1,08% 4 4,40%
Estonia 1355 0,28% 0,70% 0,73% 4 4,40%
Cyprus23 712 0,15% 0,37% 0,39% 4 4,40%
Luxembourg 449 0,09% 0,22% 0,24% 4 4,40%
Malta 396 0,08% 0,20% 0,21% 3 3,30%
total 483134 100,00% 345
Sources: CONV 802/03, Treaty of Nice (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/nice_treaty_en.pdf, 378.5
million inhabitants...,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/Public/datashop/printproduct/EN?catalogue=Eurostat&product=3-10012003-
EN-AP-EN&mode=download
The Czech Republic should, together with other Member and Candidate Countries,
welcome the simplification of the mechanism of qualified majority compared to the rules
negotiated in Nice. Similarly, from the point of transparency, Member States (current and
future ones alike) should welcome the introduction of QMV together with co-decision
procedure as the normal decision-making procedure which shall be applied as a default rule.
The proposal has unfortunately also several disadvantages for smaller Member States.
1. Drop in blocking power thanks to abolition of voting weights
Unfortunately, it was exactly the abolished voting weights which were the main safeguard of
the small countries that guaranteed their overproportional representation. It is somewhat
confusing that the criterion of majority of Member States is sometimes mentioned as the
criterion required by the small Member States to balance the population strength of the big
States. Yet, this should be seen rather as a supplement to the main criterion of voting weights.
The evidence of negotiations of the last IGC also supports this view: Every participating
country paid most of its attention to gaining as much weight as possible and only afterwards
the other issues were discussed. The Czech Republic had 12 votes at its disposal and its share
of the smallest blocking minority was thus 13,19%. According to the draft text, the share of
the ČR has shrunk to 5,28% of the smallest blocking minority (population threshold) or
7,14% (majority of Member States criterion) according to the draft constitution. Its strength to
block others’ decisions has undoubtedly suffered a heavy loss.
                                                     
23 The government-controlled part of the island.
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Figure 2 shows that those whose blocking power lost the most were paradoxically not
the small countries but (apart from Spain a Poland) the medium-sized countries.
2. Change of population threshold as a marginal disadvantage for the Big
The change of the population threshold is the only amendment slightly to big states’
disadvantage. Several studies analysing QMV under the Treaty of Nice show convincingly
that the advantage of more populous countries was more than compensated by other criteria.24
So, Germany’s advantage was rather the psychological effect of breaking the old taboo of
parity among the four biggest than a practical voting advantage.
The population threshold was lowered by mere 2%, which does not have any
tremendous effect on the overall situation of the Member States: The blocking potential of
biggest country, Germany changes from 44,97% to 42,72% and the difference is even smaller
for the others (see Table 3). To sum up, this criterion has remained largely untouched and its
importance would, after the proposed abolition of the voting weights, even increase.
3. Majority of Member States hard to achieve in an enlarged Union
This criterion was incorporated in the draft text without any change from the Treaty of Nice.
It is useful to note that, from the point of view of equality of states, it should not aim at
strengthening any particular group of countries. It would be nevertheless possible to say that,
considering the smaller population of the small countries, this criterion is more favourable for
them than for the big countries, their much larger population having the same vote as that of
the small countries. Yet, the blocking potential of the small countries should not be
overestimated. The blocking potential of every state (big and small alike) is only 7,14% and
the successful blocking requires at least 14 states.
                                                     
24 See e.g. Plechanovová, 2003
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Figure 2
Ratio of blocking minorities (comparison of the Nice Treaty and the Draft Constitution)25
The analysis of QMV blocking potential
As we can see above, if we do not judge the ability of a group of states to adopt a
decision but rather to block an unfavourable legislative act, the advantages of the new system
for the big countries and its disadvantages for the small (and especially medium) ones become
evident.26 Table 3 shows that various coalitions of with a sufficient blocking potential under
the old rules (e.g. small candidate countries plus Poland or small less developed countries)
would lose this ability with the arrival of the new system. According to the draft constitution,
these coalitions are not able to reach a blocking minority in neither of the two criteria.
                                                     
25 Here we count the ratio between the highest blocking potential of the country as provided for in the Nice
Treaty and the highest blocking potential of the same country under the new rules.
26 A similar method for evaluating the pros and cons of different QMV models is used by several authors, e.g
Moberg (2002). Others use more complicated statistical analyses (Felsenthal & Machover (2000)).
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Table 3
Blocking potential of coalitions
Group of states Population in %
and the ability to
block a decision
Blocking minority
(draft constitution,
criterion of
majority of states)
Blocking
potential
(draft
constitution)
voting
weights
(Nice
Treaty)
G, F, UK 41,66% no (3) yes 87
G, F, I 41,12% no (3) yes 87
G, UK, I 41,01% no (3) yes 87
any four out of the six
biggest (G, F, UK, I, S, P)
min. 40,33% no (4) yes min. 112
candidate countries 21,65% no (12) no 108
small less developed
countries (candidate states
without Poland plus Portugal
and Greece)
18,09% no (13) no 105
Sources: CONV 802/03, Treaty of Nice (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/nice_treaty_en.pdf, 378.5
million inhabitants...,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/Public/datashop/printproduct/EN?catalogue=Eurostat&product=3-10012003-
EN-AP-EN&mode=download
The proposal of the Presidium was not the only proposal that simplified the procedure
of QMV. The following table compares the Presidium proposal with two alternative
proposals: The double simple majority (proposed by the EC) and the proposal incorporated in
the final mandate of the Czech governmental delegate Mr. Jan Kohout which proposes
another combination of the two criteria (60% of Member States representing 60% of the
population).27 This proposal is also supported by other small countries like Slovakia,
Slovenia, Denmark or Hungary.28
Table 4
Comparison of blocking power of coalitions (alternative proposals)
Group of states Population in
%
Blocking
minority (draft
constitution,
population
threshold)
Blocking
minority
(draft
constitution)
Blocking
minority
(Commission
proposal)
Blocking
minority
(60:60)
G, F, UK 41,66% yes no no yes (41,66%
                                                     
27 This proposal has not been officially published yet.
28 Other „like-minded“ countries support the Commission proposal (50:50). But almost no small country is
satisified with the current ratio 60:50 (with the sole exception of Netherlands).
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pop.)
G, F, UK, I 53,35% yes no yes (53,35%
pop.)
yes (53,35%
pop.)
G, F, UK, S 50,08% yes no yes (50,08%
pop.)
yes (50,08%
pop.)
Other
combinations of
four out of the
six biggest
max. 49,65%,
min. 40,33%
yes no no yes (min.
40,33%
pop.)
Candidate
countries
21,65% no no no yes (12
countries)
Small less
developed
countries (cand.
countries –
Poland +
Portugal and
Greece)
18,09% no no no yes (13
countries)
Sources: CONV 802/03, Treaty of Nice (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/nice_treaty_en.pdf, 378.5
million inhabitants..., http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/Public/datashop/print-product/EN?catalogue=Eurostat
&product=3-10012003-EN-AP-EN&mode=download
This table clearly demonstrates that the argument of simplicity cannot be used to gain
unconditional support for the Presidium proposal. The other analysed alternatives show the
same amount of transparency. Both the double simple majority and the 60-60 proposal are not
more complicated and their results show greater balance between the big and the small
countries.
The Commission proposal makes the blocking minority of the big countries much
harder to achieve: No combination of the big three or four countries, with the exceptions of
two coalitions (G, F, UK, I or G, F, UK, S) is big enough to reach the required threshold of
50% of the Union’s population. This is very different from the rules of the draft constitution
under which any four out of the six biggest (G, F, UK, I, S, P) are able to block the others’
decisions. The Commission proposal presents an even more efficient system where blocking
is not an easy option for big and small countries alike. The plan was, at the same time, quite
radical and this was its biggest disadvantage: It was not able to attract any supporters from the
camp of bigger countries.
The proposal of the ČR is not so radical. In fact, it went in the other direction: Its aim
was not to equalise the position of the small and the big Member States by removing the
safeguards of the big ones but by creating a safeguard for the small (or Candidate) countries
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as well. In other words, while the Commission proposal lowers the overall possibility of
blocking the others, the Czech proposal increases it.
Thanks to the change of simple majority of Member States to 60% of Member States,
it would be much easier for the small countries to block any unpleasant decision. The
blocking minority would drop from 14 (simple majority proposal) to 11. This means both
candidate states and small less developed states (candidate countries without Poland plus
Portugal and Greece) would have the power to block the others.
Bearing in mind the effectiveness and transparency of Union decision-making, the
Commission proposal (50:50) would probably be the best option. Yet the practical results of
the negotiations of the last IGCs demonstrate that the most effective options are not always
those with the widest support. The 60:60 proposal, therefore, seems to be an equally good
starting point for the search for a compromise between the current draft constitutional text and
the demands of the unsatisfied small countries.
4. Conclusion
I analysed two interrelated topics: The proposed extension of QMV and alternative
models of QMV constitution. The general conclusion for both of them is not entirely positive
from the point of view of the Czech Republic. Neither of the proposals in the draft
constitution fully corresponds with the wishes of the Czech government and the Czech
administrative elite:
1. On basis of the presented study, we can describe the Czech governmental experts as quite
integration-minded. The list of possible extensions of QMV is, therefore, quite
impressive.. This is even more glaring when compared to the changes introduced by the
draft constitution. The Czech experts would, unlike the authors of the constitution, like to
deepen the integration in certain aspects of social policy, harmonise issues related to
indirect taxation (although not tax provision themselves), etc.
2. The constitution of QMV proposed by the draft constitution is not what small countries
have required either. The QMV consisting of simple majority of Member States and 60%
of the population is more favourable for big countries than the Commission’s proposal of
double  simple majority and, at the same time, more detrimental to small member nations.
On the other hands, alternative proposals (double simple majority or the proposal of 60%
of population and 60% of Member States) offer the same degree of transparency with
more balanced benefits for the small and the big MS. The Commission proposal, though
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being probably the best option in regard to effectiveness, is too far-reaching to be accepted
by the big MS. Therefore, the 60:60 proposal could be a good starting point for further
search for the badly needed compromise between the big and the small.
Even if the Czech negotiators at the IGC in Rome concentrate on the Commission and the rule
“one country – one Commissioner”, the question of QMV should not be altogether forgotten.
In fact, if their efforts at having a full-fledged Commissioner fail (either because the number
of Commissioners will not increase or because Commissioners from smaller countries will not
be allowed to vote), the reform of the Council and especially the change of QMV is a
remarkably good issue for small countries’ compensation.
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